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Abstract— Applying model-driven development 
methodologies provide inherent benefits such as increased 
productivity, greater reuse, and better maintainability, to 
ñame a few. Efforts on achieving model-driven development of 
web services already exist. However, there is currently no 
complete solution that addresses non-functional aspects of 
these services as well. This paper presents an ongoing work 
which seeks to intégrate these non-functional aspects in the 
development of web services, with a clear emphasis on security. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Service-Oriented Architectures (SOA), of great 
popularity nowadays, and Web Services (WS), the 
technology generally used to implement them, go hand in 
hand in such a way that they are even referred to as WSOA 
(Web Service Oriented Architecture). They achieve the 
integration of heterogeneous technologies, providing 
interoperability, and yielding to the reutilization of pre-
existent systems. 
At the same time, Model Driven Applications (MDA) [1] 
arises as a new paradigm that tries to shift models out of a 
mere documentational role, and turn them into a first class 
development artifact. This approach provides, among other 
benefits, a greater understanding of the system as a whole 
and a platform-independent development, improving the 
reusability of the design, and simplifying the evolution of the 
system, thus increasing productivity. 
WS-* standards provide a strong foundation for the 
development of services. Ws-Policy and related 
specifications also offer the possibility of considering extra-
functional concerns of those services. However, these 
specifications are XML-based, and its syntax is not thought 
to be read/written by humans. An abstraction of such 
languages is desirable. 
Some approaches applying MDA to the development of 
Web Services already exist (e.g. [2], [3], [4]). However, 
these approaches do not offer thorough support for access 
control descriptors, code generation, Web Services 
Descnption Language (WSDL) [5], and WS-Pohcy [6]. This 
paper presents ongoing work towards achieving a solution 
that includes all these previously mentioned concepts, 
focusing on a Component-Based Software Development 
(CBSD). 
II. RELATED WORK 
Among the proposals that deal with the different aspects 
supported by WS-Policy, the approach by Ortiz and 
Hernández [2] is among the most representative ones. This 
work makes use of model-driven development for including 
extra-functional aspects in web services parting from a 
platform independent model. The focus of Ortiz's work is 
somehow more generic than ours in the sense that it does not 
have an emphasis in security. Their solution makes use of 
Service Component Architecture (SCA) [7] modeling and a 
UML (Unified Modeling Language) profile. Ours, in change, 
proposes the use of domain specific languages (DSLs), more 
adapted to each of the extra-functional aspects in hand, to 
later combine these DSLs into one integrated model. Ortiz's 
work also does not provide any means to genérate the 
implementation of the security aspects previously mentioned. 
Along the same line is the proposal by Jegadeesan and 
Balasubramaniam [3]. Their model driven development 
approach is very similar to Ortiz's, dividing aspects in three 
levéis: service, business, and domain aspects. These different 
aspects are later expressed in the shape of WSDL 2.0 and 
WS-Policy documents. A service policy metamodel is 
defined for the later. Jegadeesan selects WS-Policy due to 
being a widely accepted standard, but does not maintain this 
criterion and uses WS-PolicyConstraints, a somehow stalled 
standardization process (the latest draft [8] was published in 
October 2005). Our approach, on the contrary, leaned 
towards the use of the much more accepted WS-
SecurityPolicy [9] standard. Even though Jegadeesan and 
Ortiz present use cases in their publications to probé their 
concepts, no tool implementing their approaches have been 
provided so far. 
Shifting to more access-control-oriented proposals, we 
found the SECTET framework [4], perhaps the most 
remarkable one. SECTET makes use of a model-driven 
approach to focus on confidentiality, integrity, and non-
repudiation characteristics of SOAs, using WS as the 
implementation technology. SECTET's primary goal is the 
generation of eXtensible Access Control Markup Language 
(XACML) [10] policies derived from Role Based Access 
Control (RBAC) [11] models. The work behind this 
framework appears to be very thorough, making it very 
interesting to analyze. In relation to the work presented in 
this document, while SECTET is mainly focused in access 
control and XACML policies, the goal of the presented work 
is the integration of this and other (principally, but not only) 
security aspects in one unique solution. 
In this work, it has been decided to follow WSDL and 
WS-Policy (and WS-SecurityPolicy) standards, due to their 
deep penetration and its almost universal utilization. 
Notwithstanding, the same criterion (to follow standards 
preferably) has not been applied in the case of XACML. 
XACML, although a defined standard, has still not been 
so widely adopted by the industry. A clear sign of this is that 
from most possible target platforms with aspect-oriented 
support (e.g., Spring, JBoss), few or none provide XACML 
support, and most implement a proprietary access control 
description mechanism, less verbose and complicated. Lhe 
presented work has, therefore, not adopted XACML as the 
access control language of choice, but left it as one of the 
many possible implementation options. 
Lhere are also other interesting ongoing research studies 
on the subject, (e.g. [12] and [13]). However, these works are 
either taking their first steps, or they focus on a more limited 
scope than the one of the work being presented here. 
III. IN SEARCH OF LHE INLEGRALED SOLULION 
A. Requirements and Objectives 
From within the different requirements and objectives 
placed on this research, the ones with a higher influence on 
the result follows: 
• Where feasible and convenient, reuse pre-existent 
tools/solutions (a.k.a. "don't reinvent the wheel"). 
• Use a model-driven approach. 
• Relating to target platforms, make use of the new 
aspect-oriented functionalities that are becoming 
available in the different platforms to satisfy extra-
functional requirements. 
• Adopt standards as much as possible, if practical. 
B. Defined Architecture 
Fig. 1 shows the overall structure of the designed 
solution. It consists of a chain of model transformations (L1, 
L2, L3, and L4) and compositions (Cl and C2). Every 
colored box in the figure indicates a different type of model. 
Lhese models include: 
• Functional system model (the main input model). 
• Resource access control model. 
• Non-functional aspects models (Policy model). 
• Intermedíate Meta Model (iMM) model. 
Lhe iMM metamodel was defined with the objective of 
achieving an abstraction both of input modeling 
techniques/metamodels, and output target platforms. It is 
also designed for holding in one unique model, all 
information necessary to genérate the different output 
artifacts. Lhe iMM models are automatically generated, and 
the developers need never interact with them. 
Lhe presented approach proposes the development of 
each individual concern as an independent model, in a 
similar fashion to that of Multi-Dimensional Separation of 
Concerns [14]. Lhose models are later composed into a 
complete model of the system by weaving them together. 
Lhis approach allows for the use of different DSLs, each one 
appropriate to the particular concern in hand. Lhis set of 
metamodels is presented in section IVA. 
Ideally, different access control and policy models, 
previously developed by security experts, would be 
contained in repositories. As a result, the developer of the 
system need not be security sawy, and its responsibility on 
this stage would only be to properly assign policies or 
permissions to the different system resources. Furthermore, 
this task could also be performed by a security expert, and 
the developer of the functional part of the system may fulfill 
his work independently. 
Lhe different resulting outputs to be obtained, indicated 
inFig. 1, include: 
• Access control descriptors. Lhese platform 
dependant descriptors describe the permissions each 
role in the system has to access the different 
resources available. 
• Code templates, derived from the system model. 
Lhese templates are also platform dependant. 
• WSDL descriptors and the WS-Policy documents 
referenced by those. Lhese are common to all target 
platforms. 
C. Sequence of Operation 
Lhe sequence of steps to perform in the proposed 
approach is the following: 
1) Lhe user feeds the tool with the input functional 
model (Platform Independent Model 1, PIM 1). 
2) Lhe input model is transformed (Ll) into an instance 
of the intermedíate metamodel (iMM). At this stage this 
model only contains functional information. 
3) From within the available access control and security 
policy models, the user selects the most appropriate one. 
Lhe developer could tune it to better fit his system or, 
alternatively, define his own. Please notice that, at this 
stage, the artifacts being referred to are access control and 
security policy models, not documents. 
Fig. 1. Structure of the proposed solution 
4) By means of a model composition tool, the user 
indicates which access control permissions should be 
associated to which resources. By the same token, the user 
also indicates the security policies to be applied to the 
operations offered by the service . (Marked as Cl and C2 
correspondingly in Fig. 1) 
5) All information (functional and extra-functional) is 
now contained in the platform-independent iMM model 
(PIM2). 
6) At this stage, service and policy descriptors are 
derived from the PIM 2 model. Resulting WSDL documents 
hold references to the appropriate policies defined in the 
different generated WS-Policy documents (T3). 
7) Next, access control descriptors and code templates 
are automatically created (T2 y T4). 
IV. REALIZATION OF THE APPROACH 
As a proof of concept, a prototypical implementation is 
under development. All input transformations and 
compositions (TI, Cl and C2) are complete, as well as the 
generation of WSDL and WS-Pohcy artifacts (T4). The 
implementation of the metamodels in Eclipse (some 
definitions have been reused, but no implementations were 
available at the time), the definition of the transformation 
and composition rules, and the implementation of the 
different assistants (wizards, cheat sheets, etc.) implied a 
considerable amount of work. 
The current state of such prototype also includes a cheat 
sheet that guides the development process. Only the platform 
specific parts (code-stubs and access controls descriptors) 
remain to be completed. Implementation has taken place 
over the Eclipse platform, trying to make the most of the 
functionalities provided by it. 
The design in Fig. 1 divides the implementation in 
different plugins (PG#), in order to allow for easier 
maintainability and evolution. Accordingly, the different 
artifacts to be generated (WSDL, WS-Policy, code 
templates), and the different metamodels to be composed 
(access control, policies) are to be delivered in different 
plugins. 
The plugin in charge of the composition of the 
intermedíate model, marked as PG1 in Fig. 1, is independent 
of latter generation plugins. The generation of the different 
output artifacts has also being made independent between 
themselves. This allows an autonomous evolution of each 
output with respect to new standard versions, for instance. 
A. Metamodels 
Referring to the metamodels employed in this solution, 
some pre-existent metamodels have been adopted, some 
other where merged together, whilst the rest had to be 
defined for the occasion. The different metamodels are 
described in the following sub-sections. 
1) Input Metamodel: UML 
UML, the modeling standard of choice in most cases 
nowadays, has been selected as the input's metamodel. A 
very simple UML profile is applied to these input models to 
guide the TI transformation. The objective of this profile is 
to abstract the transformation of the different ways in which 
UML is being used (e.g., different modelers prefer to 
represent software components with UML component, class, 
or package model elements). This profile is basically used to 
identify components, interfaces, entities, etc. 
2) Access Control Metamodel: SecureUML 
Although the current state of the design incorporates a 
more generic metamodel [15] (indicated in Fig. 2 as the 
access control parí), that support múltiple access control 
techniques, the prototype currently uses SecureUML [16], a 
Role Based Access Control (RBAC, one of the currently 
most used access control techniques) metamodel. 
3) Weaving Metamodels 
Weaving metamodels guide the composition mechanisms 
of the different models. In this case, weaving access control 
models and weaving policy models require different weaving 
associations. For this reason, two different metaclases for 
weaving associations are defined: "AddPolicyReference" for 
policy-weaving, and "CombineResource" for access control. 
The semantics of the associations are implemented as 
part of the composition rules. In the case of policy 
references, one new "PolicyReference" object is created on 
the model, with its URL valué derived from the ID property 
of the policy, and the location property of the document 
containing it. 
For access control compositions, a "resource" is 
associated with some particular actions (e.g. read, write, 
execute) described in the access control model. 
Correspondent actions are then created for the resource, and 
all associated permissions are introduced in the model 
(permissions connect roles with actions on resources, 
according to some attached constraints). 
Currently, "resources" that are subject of access control 
rules include operations, entities, and interfaces. Permissions 
on interfaces propágate to all its operations in all its 
realizations. By the same token, all permissions on entities 
propágate to all operations accessing them. Conflict 
resolution between propagated permissions is not discussed 
in this paper. 
4) iMM Metamodel 
The intermediate metamodel developed for this approach 
is one of the fundamental parts of the system. It was 
designed to be as general as possible, in order to maximize 
access control techniques and policy standards support. 
An excerpt of this metamodel can be seen in Fig. 2. It is 
composed of three differentiated parts: System Design, 
Access Control, and Policy. 
-para mel are ElementType 
Access 
Control 
7 " ^ : 
Prj l icvAf iSOi ' t^ i i 
PoIrtySijbjectType ^ i 
< 5 -
Policy 
System 
Design 
ir jr. 
^ 
Service 
Description! 
Fig. 2. iMM Metamodel (conceptual partial view) 
The functional part of the metamodel follows a 
component-based approach, and is used to describe service 
components, entities and interfaces, among other 
metaclasses. 
The generic metamodel [15] incorporated in the "Access 
Control" part of Fig. 2, allows for the use of different 
techmques (DAC [17], MAC[18], RBAC[11], OBAC[19]). 
Finally, the "Policy" package of CBDI-SAE Meta Model 
for SOA [20] was selected for the service policies part due to 
its grade of maturity and flexibility. It was decided not to use 
the complete CBDI-SAE metamodel itself for two main 
reasons: it didn't include access control support, and its 
business-to-business orientation made it too heavy to 
implement for the objectives placed on this work. 
The three selected metamodels where then studied to 
identify equivalent concepts that provided merging points. 
5) WSDL Metamodel 
A WSDL metamodel has been used for T4 
transformation, and in C2 composition in order to visualize 
the future WSDL document as a model and facilítate the 
specification of policy application points. This metamodel 
was first derived from the WSDL 1.2 specification schema, 
and then modified to better fit its use in editors and 
transformations. 
6) WS-Policy Metamodel 
A WS-Policy metamodel, used both in T4 transformation 
and C2 composition, has been developed for the prototype. It 
was necessary to implement it from scratch, as the 
metamodel obtained from the specification schema was not 
usable in an editor, and that all other previously existent WS-
Policy metamodels (e.g., [3]), do not allow for the use of 
both "compact" and "normal" WS-Policy mode, as intended. 
The transformations and later generation of WS-Policy 
documents opérate on this metamodel, including the case of 
WS-SecurityPolicy models. 
7) WS-SecurityPolicy Metamodel 
A WS-SecurityPolicy metamodel has been defined for 
this prototype as an extensión to the WS-Policy metamodel. 
It leverages the policy editor, facilitating the expression of 
standard security policy assertions, and allowing the 
incorporation of validation rules (defined in the standard and 
already implemented in the prototype) for such assertions. It 
is, to the best knowledge of the authors, the first available 
implementation of a WS-SecurityPolicy metamodel. 
B. Implementation and Validation ofthe Prototype 
Although the proposed approach is not tied to a specific 
implementation technology, after an evaluation of the 
available tools [21], it was decided to base the 
implementation on the Eclipse platform. 
The user interface of the tool is currently composed by a 
cheat sheet and a menú. The user can follow in the cheat 
sheet the steps described in section III. C or, alternatively, 
take the different steps independently as he sees fit by 
selecting them in the menú. 
With respect to the validation of the prototype, Eclipse's 
validation tools are being used to validate resultant WSDL 
and WS-Policy documents respectively. 
The obtained result as a whole is planned to be validated 
by implementing the WS-I [22] "Supply Chain 
Management" use case and companying validation tools, 
with security requirements included. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper has presented ongoing work towards the 
achievement of an integrated, model-driven solution for the 
development of service-oriented architectures with policy 
awareness and access control support. It is, to the knowledge 
of the authors, the first model-driven approach to intégrate 
all these functionalities together. 
The different participant metamodels have been 
presented. Among them, two stand out: the intermedíate 
metamodel, containing all necessary information for 
generating the resulting artifacts, and the WS-SecurityPolicy 
metamodel, leveraging validation security awareness. 
The proposed solution is not tied to any implementation 
or target technology, allowing for great flexibility in its 
evolution regarding the appearance of new standards or 
technologies. This is an improvement compared to editor-
based approaches, tightly coupled to the technologies they 
have been developed for. The prototype under 
implementation provides a set of functionalities not always 
found together in one only tool. 
Moreover, the WS-Policy framework itself has been 
defined in a generic fashion, allowing for many standards to 
be formulated based on it. Any new standard that may be 
defined under its umbrella will automatically be supported 
by this solution, and its assertions can readily be applied. 
Consequently, all already available or in process of being 
defined policy standards are supported by the tool (e.g., WS-
Addressing [23], WS-AtomicTransaction [24]). This 
leverages its use for developing not only security-aware 
services, but also include timing constraints, secure 
exchange, transactions, etc. 
With respect to future work, in the short term it will be 
focused on finishing the implementation of the prototype, 
mostly on the generation of code templates and access 
control descriptors for a determined platform. Some work 
has been done to intégrate Eclipse's Connected Data Objects 
(CDO) repositories within it. 
In a longer term, it is planned to consider other policy 
aspects under standardization process. As previously 
mentioned, the approach is flexible enough to support any 
WS-Policy-based standard, but it is not able to use the 
information intrinsic to the assertion for its benefit (shaping 
of code generation, configuration of target platform, 
generation/use of an extra-functional aspect, e.g.). 
Additionally, researching on the semantics of timing 
constraints and requirements on services, its expression as 
policies, and its effects on the shaping of the generated code 
could provide interesting results. 
On a different token, the shifting from a metamodel-
based generation approach towards a weaving-based 
generation approach (in which any metamodel could be used 
to genérate artifacts based on a set of weaving associations) 
could provide an alternative line of research. 
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